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Abstract: 
There has been increasing attention paid to non-communicable disease risk factors 
including tobacco, diet, alcohol and a lack of physical activity.  The tobacco control model 
has moved from largely supply side, ‘harm regulation’ measures of the 1950s and 1960s 
(e.g. ‘safe’ cigarettes, education, self-regulation) to demand side, neo-prohibitionism in the 
1980s (e.g. mandatory restrictions) with the increased attention paid to second hand 
smoke issues.  Obesity as well as alcohol remain in the ‘harm regulation’ model although 
there have been attempts to move toward a more demand side model.  Despite the 
attractiveness of the tobacco control model for obesity policy change, progress has been 
slow.  We analyse the prospects for moving obesity policy towards a neo-prohibitionist 
model. 
 
 
 
I Regulatory regimes for non-communicable diseases 
While much of the improvement in life expectancy has been achieved through better prevention 
of infectious diseases, it is increasingly recognised that major advances now are required for 
dealing with non-communicable diseases (NCDs).  The 2011 UN High-level Meeting on the 
Prevention and Control of NCDs refers to four risk factors - tobacco use, poor diet, lack of physical 
activity,1 and harmful use of alcohol – for the four major NCDs: cancer, cardiovascular diseases, 
diabetes, and chronic respiratory illnesses.  Recent reports on cancer warn of the increasingly 
strong relationship between obesity and cancer, now rivalling that of smoking. 
Obesity has become a recognised policy problem globally over the past few decades.  Similar to 
other food-related issues, it is subject to complex and fragmented regulatory arrangements 
intertwining public and private organisations at various levels of government.  Questions about 
the relationship between nutrition and health, especially the role of calorie-dense and nutrient-
poor foods, have reached the political agenda at all levels of government ranging from the local 
to the international.  Hence the devolved government of Scotland has to make these choices as 
do international bodies such as the European Union, the United Nations – especially through the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) – the 
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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.  Indeed, 
since foods are large-scale consumer products, it is an issue that is also intimately connected to 
international trade and hence potentially to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and global 
agreements on trade (e.g. the WTO’s current Doha Round). 
As a relatively new issue, obesity lacks successful ‘exemplar programmes’ for prevention 
(Swinburn et al. 2011).  Several comparisons have been made  about how obesity policies could 
follow the well-established path of public health tobacco policies in Western democracies, 
principally drawing lessons from individual countries, the EU and the WHO-stimulated Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) of 2003 (Brownell and Warner 2009; Alemanno and 
Garde 2013; Klein and Dietz 2010; Lien and Deland 2011).  From inauspicious beginnings where 
the political economy of tobacco growing, manufacture, consumption and taxation trumped public 
health interests, tobacco policy has haltingly emerged over the past half century to be considered 
a public health success story.  The tobacco experience highlights a decades-long struggle by 
tobacco control groups to form alliances, challenge vested interests, engage in a ‘battle of ideas’ 
with tobacco companies, encourage major social change, shift policymaking responsibility to 
more sympathetic government departments and persuade governments to completely rethink the 
ways in which they understand the tobacco issue.  Major changes in policy, including increasingly 
restrictive regulations on consumption, taxation, sales and advertising culminated in the first 
international health treaty.  Collectively these measures have led to less smoking and measurable 
benefits in the reduction of morbidity and mortality (Cairney et al. 2012). 
Alcohol regulation presents an alternative model of regulation, one that is more diverse across 
Western democracies.  These policies range from relatively restrictive ones, especially on sales, 
in Scandinavian countries such as Iceland, Norway and Sweden to lighter regulation in more 
southern European countries such as Italy and France.  But all of them could be called versions 
of a ‘harm regulation’ policy, modelled to fit local conditions, as also now obtains in the US and 
Canada on a state / provincial basis.  Typically, analyses of the problem of alcohol consumption 
(as above) refer to ‘excessive’, ‘harmful’, ‘addictive’, or ‘problem’ drinking.  The aim of these 
various policies is thus to minimise dangerous effects rather than to eliminate alcohol 
consumption per se.  Over the past decade, the UK government under both Labour and the 
Conservative-Liberal coalition has resisted demands from public health advocates and officials, 
including medical officers, for tighter regulation (Baggott 2011; Cairney and Studlar 2014).  Thus, 
in terms of policy, political economy considerations (i.e. the economic benefits of encouraging 
consumption) have continued to dominate over those of public health. 
Despite a quarter century of growing international concern about obesity, it remains the case that 
it follows a ‘harm regulation’ regime everywhere and one that is even weaker than that for alcohol.  
A recent systematic study of obesity-related laws in Europe and the United States found that most 
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nutrition policies were targeted at: schools or other setting-specific sites; general consumer 
information through labelling; and government-encouraged collective ‘voluntary’ schemes by food 
producers (Sisnowski et al. 2015).  Taxation, prohibition and direct regulation of food marketing 
were rare.  ‘Responsibility agreements’ have become the norm for nutrition/obesity, despite 
criticism from public health advocates (Alemanno and Garde 2013; Gilmore et al. 2011; Sharma 
et al. 2010).2  Perhaps surprisingly, the US federal government, following some state and 
municipal government action, has passed some of the strongest anti-obesity provisions through 
broad-ranging executive orders on posting calorie counts for prepared food as well as changes 
in agricultural price supports to encourage production and consumption of more nutritious food 
(Tavernise and Strom 2014; Sheingate 2014).  What are the prospects for further change in 
obesity policy that might move toward the ‘tobacco model’ of increasing restrictiveness? 
 
II Policy Approaches and Instruments 
Governments are reluctant to take on the regulation of economically beneficial products if they 
require new agencies, reorganisation, new procedures, and/or additional financing.  Thus, the 
first response usually is to try to institute a harm regulation (harm reduction, harm minimisation) 
regime, involving voluntary self-regulation, education, and perhaps a few targeted restrictions 
such as limits on televised advertising, plus sponsorship of research into how to make 
consumption of the product safer. 
These policy instruments are related to a focus on supply versus demand side policy approaches.  
Demand-side policies emphasise ‘informed consent’ by buyers, with minimal government 
regulation.  Voluntary ‘codes of conduct’ traditionally have been a major tool for public policy in 
the UK as part of what Vogel (1983) labels ‘cooperative regulation’. 
Supply-side solutions involve government interventions to limit the choices of consumers. Critics 
of supply side policies, including tobacco and food interests, typically argue that such measures 
constitute paternalism from ‘the nanny state’.  Proposals for wider supply-based policies to reduce 
obesity, such as considered in recent years by the UK Labour party, have been subjected to 
vigorous attack when proposed (Shaw 2008; Walters and Owens 2014).  
In addition to these general approaches, recently there has emerged ‘co-regulation’ (also called 
semi-mandatory or even semi-regulatory instruments; see Sisnowski et al. 2015) in which private 
sector actors negotiate an acceptable regulatory regime with government.  Mostly, enforcement 
is left to the private sector although a public authority can step in if necessary. 
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The problem with relying on the demand side, perhaps in combination with light regulation, is that, 
despite widespread availability of information, the public may not be able to apply it to purchases 
of harmful consumer products.  Nutrition information is complicated and confusing.  Voluntary 
interventions generally have been found to be ineffective (Sharma et al. 2010; Jacobsen 2014). 
Harm regulation was the original policy adopted in tobacco control in the post-War period after 
the initial ‘tobacco scare’ of the early 1950s.  Governments and tobacco companies attempted to 
deal with consumption hazards through the development of ‘safer cigarettes’ (Berridge 2004; 
Cairney et al. 2012).  Since the 1980s, neo-prohibitionism became the goal of tobacco control 
policies (Cariney et al. 2012).  Prohibition as policy option, including bans on the production, sale, 
and sometimes consumption of an already-established addictive product, has been in disfavour 
worldwide since the failed experiments of ‘national prohibition’ of alcohol in the US and other 
countries in the early twentieth century (Schrad 2010).  In contrast, neo-prohibitionism involves 
government attempts to reduce consumption of a product to progressively lower levels through a 
variety of ever-more restrictive policy tools rather than banning sales entirely.  The underlying 
philosophy, however, is well summed up by the Australian-originated slogan: ‘Every cigarette is 
doing you damage’.4 
There have been increasingly restrictive policy instruments on tobacco over the past half century, 
moving from education, self-regulation, and limited advertising restrictions toward fines, legal 
sanctions, and more restrictive calibrations (settings) of instruments (Studlar and Cairney 2014).  
The use of graphic warning labels in a growing number of countries, and plain packaging in a few 
(including the UK), shows the extent to which restrictions have been adopted.  Advocates such 
as Marion Nestle (2013) have suggested that a similar repertoire of tools should be used to 
combat obesity. 
Nevertheless, as indicated previously, harm regulation remains the dominant approach to obesity 
in the world, including by the WHO and the EU.  Because of the complexities of food, it would be 
difficult to implement a policy of neo-prohibitionism.  Limiting sales and consumption of some 
types of energy-dense foods along the lines now common for tobacco products may be possible, 
and several regulatory proposals have been made.  Nevertheless, the standard so far has been 
to meet minimum labelling standards on contents.  With only a few exceptions across the globe: 
unhealthy foods are taxed at the same rate as healthy foods; advertising restrictions, even for 
children’s programming, are usually voluntary; and, there are few government-imposed warning 
labels.  But there has begun to be discussion and some action on warning labels on nutritional 
value, mandated advertising limits for children’s television programming, differential taxation and 
limits on sugary drinks (Alemanno and Garde 2013). 
Some observers have questioned whether regulations on food to prevent obesity can follow a 
similar path as on tobacco because there is no equivalent to ‘second hand smoke’, which was a 
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critical issue in stricter regulation of smoking; no established single addictive element, such as 
nicotine (although sugar is a prime suspect); and no indications that a public health framing of 
food issues is likely to displace the political economy frame.  Obesity policy also lacks equivalent 
measures to address damaging behaviour directly, such as the ‘smoking ban’. 
However, for obesity, arguments for stronger regulation have begun to focus on eating habits 
acquired in childhood, a vulnerable population group.  As in smoking, any self-regulation conflicts 
with the industrial need to acquire lifetime customers of the product at an early age.  More 
generally, harm regulation as a goal is not likely to be abandoned anytime soon in obesity 
prevention. Establishing the scientific evidence base for regulation is a slow process, proceeding 
country by country, and likely to encounter ferocious resistance by powerful food producing 
interests.  But it took almost a half century for such a transition to occur in tobacco policy, a task 
that seemed unimaginable from the perspective of the 1950s. 
 
III Conclusion 
Nevertheless, overall tobacco policy still stands sui generis in its outputs among risk factors for 
NCDs.  This is largely due to the development and spread of ideas that de-normalised not only 
the product (cigarettes) and behaviour (smoking), but also the industry itself (‘Big Tobacco’) as a 
source of trusted research and advice (Studlar 2002), a process that Smith (2013) calls ‘tobacco 
exceptionalism’. 
In principle, the regulation of other NCD risk factors provides comparable opportunities and 
constraints.  Tobacco control has proceeded further along the path towards stronger regulation.  
Both alcohol and food have long regulatory histories, but only recently has food regulation focused 
on the obesity problem.  Some advocates contend that obesity prevention has made considerable 
progress, considering its relatively short length of time on the political agenda (Emanuel and 
Steinmetz 2014). 
Despite ‘tobacco control envy’, nutrition / obesity policy will find it difficult to follow the path of 
global tobacco policy towards neo-prohibitionism.  It is difficult to demonise an industry that 
produces essential commodities and other products for which there is not yet an addictive 
‘smoking gun’, and in a policy realm in which political economy considerations such as more food 
production still dominate.  Nevertheless, the outcome of the contemporary policy struggle, at 
multiple levels, has enormous implications for the future of obesity policy across the globe. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 Lack of physical activity is often paired with diet / nutrition as part of the obesity problem although 
it is sometimes considered as a fourth dimension (Alemanno and Garde 2013).  While activity is 
undoubtedly important, we focus specifically on diet / nutrition. 
 
2
 For instance, the EU Pledge is a voluntary initiative by leading food and beverage companies to 
change food and beverage advertising to children under the age of twelve in the European Union.  
It consists of two main commitments: (1) No advertising for food and beverage products to 
children under the age of twelve on TV, print and internet, except for products which fulfil specific 
nutritional criteria based on accepted scientific evidence and/or applicable national and 
international dietary guidelines; and (2) No communication related to products in primary schools, 
except where specifically requested by, or agreed with, the school administration for educational 
purposes.  These are minimum common standards that enable joint monitoring and 
accountability.  Individual companies can apply corporate standards that go above and beyond 
these common rules.  The EU Pledge was launched in December 2007 as part of the European 
Union Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, the multi-stakeholder forum.  In 
the context of the EU Platform, the EU Pledge commitment is endorsed by the World Federation 
of Advertisers (WFA).  EU Pledge member companies represent over 80% of food and beverage 
advertising expenditure in the EU.  The initiative is open to any food and beverage company 
active in Europe and willing to subscribe to the EU Pledge commitments. (www.eu-pledge.eu). 
 
3
 These are also called ‘personal responsibility’ versus ‘envirornmental’ (Kersh 2009) and ‘soft’ 
versus ‘hard’ policies (Engelhard et al.2009). 
 
4
 Ironically, harm regulation has now returned to tobacco control policy debates in the controversy 
over how to regulate electronic cigarettes and other instruments designed to allow addicted 
smokers to satisfy their nicotine cravings without inhaling tobacco smoke. These sources of 
nicotine are demonstrably less harmful than cigarettes.  On the other hand, neo-prohibitionists 
argue that they do not represent zero harm, may have unknown dangers, and also may be 
‘gateways’ to regular smoking.  Furthermore, the producers of e-cigarettes are increasingly major 
tobacco companies.  The debate over an appropriate regulatory regime for e-cigarettes, 
especially how closely it should resemble those for cigarettes, has been joined in many 
jurisdictions in recent years (Gilmore and Hartwell 2014; Jopson 2014). 
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